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Like the Octopus, which is essentially blind in the absence of movement
but strikes at every shadow that moves by, the social scientist not only
notices whatever moves but usually considers it bad. Thus it is with mal-
practice. Malpractice law is held in low repute largely because it has re-
cently changed. 1
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law. A.B. 1967,
J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Editor-in-Chief, Law, Medicine & Health Care.
1. THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MiALPRACTICE 283 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Powerful forces are at work transforming modern medicine.
Technological advances, new institutional structures, changing
modes of payment, and new categories of allied health profession-
als can each claim an important impact on medical practice.2 Mal-
practice litigation is another such transforming force promoting
changes in medical practices. Tort litigation is a major current in a
sea of pressures, and is much more than a simple problem bobbing
in the wake of other major changes. Several emerging areas of liti-
gation, such as wrongful life suits, are symptomatic of the emer-
gence of technological medicine which creates "zones of
transition."3 These zones of transition present difficult problems
2. Third party reimbursement practices represent a powerful force converging
on medical practice, but one which this article will not discuss in depth. The
desire for reimbursement leads to an understandable clamor by subgroups
such as nurses and other health professionals as they demand recognition as
independent providers. If new allied health professionals are recognized,
they are likely to be held to the higher standard of practice of the traditional
medical specialities to which they are most related.
The third party payor's listing of approved billable treatments may prove
to be a mixed blessing. If a defendant's mode of treatment or diagnosis is on
an approved list for purposes of reimbursement, that list may be evidence in
defense of the propriety of treatment in a particular case; however, such a list
may then deny an evidentiary shield to the defendant who uses an effective
but unlisted approach. Third party reimbursement promises a complex and
bewildering array of problems.
The most recent change in reimbursement practice comes from new Medi-
care reimbursement regulations. New prospective payment legislation re-
quires Medicare to fix prices in advance on a cost-per-case basis, using 467
categories called "diagnosis-related groups" (DRG's). The hospital is the
central instrument of this policy, which promises to complicate treatment de-
cisions in substantial ways. One commentator notes:
Once physicians begin to encounter this process- reacting to
new incentives to reduce lengths of stay, limit laboratory tests, and
adopt policies to reduce the use of inpatient services-a whole set of
other questions arises dealing with quality, access, and appropriate-
ness of treatment. Balancing these conflicting demands will be a tall
order.
Iglehart, Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals, 308 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1428, 1432 (1983). Physicians are already afraid of increased malpractice
exposure as a result of the new Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) prospective
payment system. The AMA in a recent report stated:
There is a sense of foreboding... because of the anticipated pres-
sure by hospitals to curtail the ordering of diagnostic procedures and
shorten hospital lengths of stay. Both could result in increased
claims for failure to order medically necessary diagnostic procedures
and premature discharge.
MEDICAL LIABILTY ADVISORY SERVICE 2 (Dec. 1983).
3. This phrase was coined by Bruce Watson in an unpublished paper, Liability
for Failure to Acquire or Use Computers in Medicine (unpublished paper on
fie with the author) [hereinafter cited as Watson].
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for those practicing medicine. This article will briefly trace some
transforming forces on medical practice, develop major categories
of medical errors, and then analyze the inner workings of tort doc-
trine as it affects medical practice.
Discussions of professional regulation tend to downplay the
role of malpractice litigation, portraying it as useful only for the
sanctioning of gross violations of professional norms. In fact, such
litigation should be viewed as a form of microregulation of undesir-
able practices. Such microregulation has substantial positive ben-
efits, such as improved medical disclosure of risks to patients,4
increased hospital sensitivity to iatrogenic events,5 and closer
monitoring of drug use. The impact of malpractice litigation on the
behavior of medical professionals has been the subject of much de-
bate among economists, 6 lawyers and doctors; but some general
conclusions have emerged. One recent analysis concluded, with
regard to incentives provided by malpractice suits:
[I]t is not implausible that the current non-trivial incidence of injury due
to negligence would be at least 10 percent higher, were it not for the incen-
tives for injury prevention, created by the one in ten incidents of malprac-
tice that result in a claim. If so, the malpractice system, despite its costs,
is worth retaining.
7
Tort liability is first of all a system of quality control, and must
be evaluated by its successes in deterring bad medical practices.
Compensation is a secondary systemic goal, since it can be
achieved more effectively and at lower cost through other mecha-
nisms.8 Recent studies of malpractice claims have reached several
interesting conclusions. First, most extreme criticisms of the sys-
tem are unfounded, and the number of malpractice claims falls far
short of the number of incidents of malpractice. 9 The data does
not reveal the existence of a malpractice crisis. Rather, as one
4. Novack, Changes in Physicians'Attitudes Toward Telling the Cancer Patient,
241 J.A.M.A. 897, 898 (1979) (noting that, in 1961, 12 percent of surveyed physi-
cians generally told a patient about a cancer diagnosis, and, by 1977, 98 per-
cent reported a general policy of telling the patient).
5. Steel, Iatrogenic Illness on a General Medical Service at a University Hospi-
tal, 304 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 638 (1981). A new speciality within hospital admin-
istration, risk management, illustrates this sensitivity.
6. L. Pocinki, S. Dogger, & B. Schwartz, The Incidence oflatrogenic Injuries, in
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, APPENDIX REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 50, 51 (D.H.E.W.
Pub. No.(os) 73-89) (1973) [hereinaftercited as L Pocinkil; THE ECONOMICS
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 1; Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the
Medical Malpractice System, 1 BEH. SCIENCES & LAw 39 (1983); Schwartz &
Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical
Malpractice, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978).
7. Danzon, supra note 6, at 53.
8. Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 6, at 1282.
9. Danzon, supra note 6, at 51.
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commentator has observed, "only very recently have malpractice
insurance costs become large enough to be interesting."10 In fact,
the current system may provide significant incentives for changes
in medical practice. One economist noted: "A finding that mal-
practice premiums are being shifted and that defensive medicine
is being practiced is not damning evidence against the system. In-
deed, one purpose of a tort system is to change the way medicine is
practiced."" Liability insurance may therefore provide too much
insulation to physicians from the deterrent impact of sanctions.' 2
Second, it is not evident from the data that claims strike physi-
cians like lightning, unpredictably and randomly. To the contrary,
one study concluded that "claims are far from random. Past claim
history is as good a predictor of future claim experience as medical
specialty."13 Third, peer review as a means of controlling negligent
medical practice is not likely to be effective.14 Malpractice litiga-
tion, therefore, has a significant and productive function in assur-
ing quality control.
Discussions of medical malpractice often culminate in the
adoption of one of two extreme views: the trial lawyer's view that
injured patients deserve compensation, with the treating physician
as the best source of compensation; and the physician's view that
such suits unfairly penalize judgmental errors while raising the
costs of practicing medicine. The economist's viewpoint-that,
from a quality control perspective, malpractice suits are useful-
draws our attention to the central issues: How do the inner work-
ings of tort doctrine affect or reduce the level of various medical
errors? Can we improve tort rules to better promote litigation that
will reduce medical errors, particularly those which cause a large
share of injuries? Can we divert litigation theories away from the
individual physician and toward the hospital, the product supplier,
or the health care institution, when errors are traceable to the cul-
pability of the latter?
10. Burghardt, Medical Malpractice and the Supply of Physicians, in THE Eco-
NOMICS OF MEDICAL MALP;RACTICE, supra note 1, at 122.
11. THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 1, at 282.
12. Danzon, supra note 6, at 51.
13. Id. at 44.
14. As one commentator has noted:
The potential for success of peer review is based on some further
assumptions: that it is possible for peers to evaluate performance
quality, that they have the will and the mechanism to bring malefac-
tors to account, and that sanctions are available to punish misdeeds.
All are required if self-regulation is to succeed in protecting the pub-
lic. But there are, in fact, difficulties and obstacles in each of these
areas, and in many respects the assumptions are unwarranted."
Haug, The Sociological Approach to Self-Regulation, in REGULATING THE PRO-
FESSIONS, 61, 64-65 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
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II. MEDICAL ERRORS: REFINING THE TORT STANDARD
OF CARE
Iatrogenesis, defined as the undesirable side effects of medical
intervention, is not a new phenomenon. The major study under-
taken by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973
noted that a substantial percentage of adverse medical outcomes
occur as the result of treatment. 5 Other studies have concluded
that many surgical deaths are avoidable.16 Two recent studies
have focused upon surgical mishaps' 7 and upon iatrogenic illness
in a general medical service at a university hospital.'8
The first study, surveying avoidable adverse outcomes from co-
Ionic surgery, concluded that "[t] he penalties for such misadven-
tures turned out to be severe, with 10 times the mortality, seven
times the average cost, and four times the length of hospitalization
expected in average patients undergoing comparable but uncom-
plicated colonic surgical procedures."19 Of 56 types of errors that
occurred, 31 were "those of unnecessary, contra-indicated, or tech-
nically defective surgical activity."20 Other sources of the medical
"errors" identified by the authors, admittedly in an impressionistic
fashion, were misplaced optimism, a sense of unwarranted ur-
gency, the urge for perfection, and the use of vogue therapies: all
errors of commission.2 '
The second study, of general medical services at a university
hospital, monitored 815 patients during a five month period in
15. L. Pocincki, supra note 6, at 51.
16. A study, jointly sponsored by the American College of Surgeons and the
American Surgical Association, concluded that 796 of the 1,696 deaths or com-
plications arising out of 1,493 surgical operations examined were avoidable.
C. CHILD, THE CRITICAL INCIDENT STUDY OF SURGICAL DEATHS AND COMPLICA-
TIONS 1973-1975 (1975), discussed in Study on Quality of Surgery is Unveiled,
MEDICAL WORTD NEWS, Jan. 26, 1976, at 24-25. See also Brody, Incompetent
Surgery Is Found Not Isolated, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 6. A study
of the death rate in Los Angeles County during a doctors' work slowdown
confirmed a drop in the death rate, which has been linked to the sharp reduc-
tion in the amount of elective surgery performed during the slowdown. See
Wash. Post, October 20, 1978, at A6, col. 5.
17. Couch, The High Cost of Low-Frequency Events, NEW ENG. J. MED. 634-37
(1981).
18. Steel, s-ypra note 5, at 638-42.
19. Couch, supra note 17, at 634.
20. Id. at 635.
21. Id. at 637. However, from a legal standpoint, the errors of commission do not
appear to have involved negligence. The authors were concerned about their
findings, and proposed that a legal safeguard was needed against malpractice
suits for errors in judgment, i.e., "error simply related to flawed reasoning" as
opposed to negligence. Id. Malpractice suits only succeed, according to the
authors, in driving into concealment the "forces that could help to reveal and
control epidemiologic sources of error." Id.
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1979.22 Of these, 290 (36 percent) had one or more iatrogenic ill-
nesses, seventy-six (9 percent) had major complications, and of
the fifteen who died (2 percent of all patients and more than 5 per-
cent of those with complications), iatrogenic illness was believed
to be a contributing cause. The intervention categories were
drugs, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, and miscellaneous.
The overall conclusion was that "the risk incurred during hospitali-
zation is not trivial" and "the risk of a serious problem may well
have increased" in the last twenty years.23 Causes of this hospital-
ization risk included routine monitoring of a range of physiologic
characteristics, often leading to earlier interventions than might
have occurred in the past, use of a wide range of potent drugs, and
therapeutic procedures in general.24
The level of patient harm demonstrated by these recent studies
raises the question of whether malpractice litigation can be used to
accomplish risk reduction. Tort litigation can be a central force in
promoting change. An analysis of types of medical errors may sug-
gest possible alterations in tort doctrine to better deal with
iatrogenesis.
A. Physician Fault-The Negligence Standard
Malpractice, in the area of professional tort liability, refers to
that category of acts or omissions which are "faulty"2 5 or negli-
gent.26 Traditionally, negligence suits have been brought against
the physician who has diagnosed or treated the plaintiff, with the
issue being whether his conduct deviated from the professional
standard of practice within his specialty. In a non-malpractice
negligence suit, a defendant can present evidence of a "customary
practice" which he would claim to have followed in the particular
22. Steel, supra note 5, at 638.
23. Id. at 641.
24. Id. While no opinion as to negligence was offered, strong suggestions were
made for better mechanisms "to assess the hazards of hospitalization in an
ongoing manner," for an intensified search for means to reduce the frequency
and severity of iatrogenic events, and for a shared concern for deficiencies in
medical review within the hospital. Id.
25. If the harm to the patient is intentionally caused, the defendant's conduct
will still be judged by the professional or ethical norms of practice of the pro-
fession. These cases are often dramatic, such as that of Dr. Nork, who per-
formed countless sugical procedures which he was incompentent to perform
and knew to be unnecessary. Gonzales v. Nork, No. 228566 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento County, Nov. 19,1973). For excerpts, see S. LAw & S. POLAN, PAIN
AND PROFIT: THE POLrICS OF MALPRACTICE 215-45 (1978).
26. Tort rules have traditionally attempted to render the plaintiff whole, after he
has suffered injury at the hands of another, by forcing the defendant to pay
compensation. This is justified on the principle that the defendant can in
fairness be taxed because of his fault.
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case. The trier of fact is free to accept or reject this standard, and
may find the defendant liable in spite of evidence that he followed
a customary practice.2 7 In malpractice cases, however, the custom-
ary practice of the profession determines the standard of care
against which an individual's behavior is judged. The standard is
"what is customary and usual in the profession."28 The trier of fact
is not allowed to reject the customary practice as improper. The
medical profession, therefore, has the privilege of setting its own
standard of conduct merely by adopting and acknowledging its
own treatment practices.29
The justification for this deference to customary medical prac-
tice has been the courts' perceived lack of expertise in judging an-
other profession, and their fear of imposing liability based upon an
uneducated judgment. Even if the customary medical practice is
inadequate, dangerous, or out-of-date, the plaintiff has lacked a
doctrinal basis for attacking the standard itself. Thus, the stan-
dard is proven by evidence of actual patterns of medical practice
without any normative evaluation as to whether the existing prac-
tice is either effective or useful. One critic of the customary prac-
tice standard has observed:
The controlling standard thus would be defined exclusively in terms of
medical procedures that have occurred with sufficient regularity in the
past to become unmistakably etched into the practice of the profession.
This raises the spectre of the past elevated to prologue in the scientifically
dynamic and fluid field of medicine.3 0
The suggestion has been made that the standard should be "ac-
cepted practice" in lieu of customary practice, thereby allowing
practices that are approved by the leaders of the profession, even if
not customarily followed. This model would allow for the evalua-
tion of a standard by reference to the state of the art in diagnosis
and treatment. Even without historical antecedents, conduct
might be evaluated as sound professional practice on the basis of
current medical literature. Such an evaluation could rely heavily
on expert witnesses' testimony concerning the best practice.31
Two exceptions to the general rule regarding proof of the stan-
dard of care bridge the gap between the traditional "customary
practice" test and the accepted practice proposal. First, the "re-
27. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165 (4th ed. 1971). See generally J. KING,
THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NuTsHELL 36-80 (1977).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 30.
30. King, In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession-The 'Ac-
cepted Practice' Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1236 (1975).
31. Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (standard not deter-
mined "solely by a plebiscite").
[Vol. 63:810
MALPRACTICE REVISITED
spectable minority" rule allows for variation in clinical judgment,
holding that "a physcian does not incur liability merely by elect-
ing to pursue one of several recognized courses of treatment."32
As long as the patient is informed of treatment alternatives in com-
pliance with informed consent requirements, the physician is pro-
tected. However, distinctive practices must be supported by at
least a respectable minority within the professional group if the
judge is to be willing to direct a verdict rather than leave the ques-
tion for the jury to resolve based upon the conflicting testimony of
the proponents of the two opinions.33 Second, a "best judgement"
rule has been allowed in some cases, postulating that a physician
must act in a manner consistent with his best judgment.34 Clearly,
the defendant physician must be able to articulate a reasoned de-
fense of the treatment decision in order to convince the trier of fact
to override the standard of care.
On rare occasions, courts have even recognized that a custom-
ary medical practice may be negligent. In Helling v. Carey,35 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the defendant opthalmolo-
gists were negligent as a matter of law in failing to administer a
simple glaucoma test to a patient under the age of forty, despite
uncontradicted expert testimony that it was universal practice not
to do so. However, Helling and the few cases that have overridden
the customary practice rule36 have all involved a therapy or diag-
nostic procedure that was readily understandable by lay persons.
This has allowed the trier of fact to weigh-without expert testi-
mony-the relative risk of injury caused by the procedure, and by
its omission. These cases have not been followed by most jurisdic-
tions, because courts are normally reluctant to replace the stan-
dards of care established within the profession with judicially
contrived standards, especially in complex cases. However, courts
may be willing to critically evaluate the customary practice where
a plaintiff can produce some evidence indicating that the practice
is out-of-date or ineffective and, therefore, dangerous.
The failure of a physician to follow an accepted or customary
32. Downer v. Veilleus, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974).
33. Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976).
34. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262-63, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372-73, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968) (physician must follow his best judgment, even if it
requires precautions in addition to those customarily followed in
community).
35. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
36. See Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 465, 235
N.E.2d 671, 674 (1968) ("what is usual or customary procedure might itself be
negligence"); Favaora v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct.
App. 1962). See also Note, An Evaluation of Charges in the Medical Standard
of Care, 23 VAND. L REV. 729, 742 (1970).
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standard of medical practice may be attributable to: the inatten-
tiveness of the physician on a particular occasion, even though he
is an otherwise skillful, well-trained doctor; a failure of medical ed-
ucation or training, or of the physician to keep abreast of his field;37
or the personal inability of a physician, who is operating outside of
his sphere of competence, to deal with a particular problem. How-
ever, the tort system holds a physician accountable for intentional
or negligent deviations from medical practice, whatever the ex-
cuse. These errors imply that the physician has failed to perform
at the level that his profession requires. This category of medical
error is, thus, measured by the benchmark of a profession-wide
standard, focusing upon the individual practitioner and his devia-
tion from accepted professional practice. The types of errors likely
to be detected are those of the unethical or slipshod doctors, who
are probably responsible for only a small, although significant,
percentage of harm to patients.
B. Professional Shortcomings and Medical Innovation
Deficiencies within a medical specialty may cause iatrogenic
harm. These deficiencies may include problems of scientific igno-
rance, inadequate evaluation of diagnostic instruments and proce-
dures before use, or failure to educate members. A medical
specialty may be in its infancy, so that knowledge about etiologies
of illness and techniques of treatment is incomplete. Those thera-
peutic techniques that are available may not yet have been per-
fected to the point where substantial risks of side effects can be
eliminated.
Although injury to a patient may be caused by the shortcom-
ings of a particular therapist in a given case, it is not the individ-
ual's failure, but rather that of the profession as a whole that can
fairly be said to have caused injury. We single out the individual
physician for liability, but it is really a mirror image of vicarious
libility we are imposing; while the profession is collectively at
fault, it is the individual therapist who is inevitably penalized for
those collective shortcomings.3 8 The causes cited by the studies
suggest that errors in this category (e.g., vogue therapies, multiple
drug administration) account for a significant percentage of the ia-
trogenic harms suffered.39
Where medical errors are related to professional shortcomings
(e.g., too rapid diffusion of vogue treatments, or excessive reliance
37. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
38. See Gorovitz & MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 1 J. MED. &
PHIL. 51 (1976).
39. Couch, supra note 7, at 636; Steel, supra note 5, at 639.
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on unproven diagnostics) we need to ask how tort standards and
proof requirements can be altered to reduce medical errors. Four
effects of a tort standard are possible, ard the choice of one over
another depends on one's perception of dominant sources of medi-
cal error.
1. Standard-neutral
The first approach-labeled the standard-neutral approach-is
closest to the present customary practice standard. As a statistical
matter, this tort standard simply mirrors whatever the profession
does. The position of neutrality by courts in determining the pro-
fessional standards, as discussed above, means that the profession
is dominant in setting standards, and is able to provide a safe har-
bor from tort liability for any practitioner who follows the prac-
tice- regardless of its effectiveness.
2. Standard-forcing
The second approach-standard-forcing-operates at two
levels. First, courts have on rare occasions set the appropriate
standard of practice in spite of evidence indicating that the cus-
tomary practice is either to the contrary or is less demanding. Hel-
ling v. Carey is a good example of a rare judicial attempt to force
the level of practice higher. Second, where a new speciality is
emerging, such as genetic counseling, the lack of a consensus stan-
dard means that some defendants will be found liable because
they were unable to justify their practice by reference to general
practice.
The process of developing a consensus as to a physician's stan-
dard of care is a complex one, and is of particular concern to practi-
tioners in new speciality areas. Concern has been expressed that
litigation will drive out new practitioners, and expose others to un-
manageable expenses. 40 The litigation process contains its own
safeguards, however. Individual plaintiffs must prove their cases,
presenting evidence and persuading the trier of fact that they
should prevail. To do this, plaintiffs must use expert witnesses.
Unless plaintiffs can find experts who will testify as to the exist-
ence of established standards of care for any given treatment or
mode of diagnosis, the floodgates of litigation are unlikely to let in
more than a trickle of suits against physicians in new specialty ar-
eas. As standards evolve, however, such expertise will certainly be
more available to plaintiffs. It is precisely this chain of events that
illustrates the indirect pressure of tort litigation on the medical
40. See Taub, Wrongful Life-The Problems Are Not Just Semantic: A Reply to
Furrow, 10 L. MED. & HEALTH CAE 208, 210 (1982).
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profession: the threat of suits will eventually force the medical
community to attempt to develop a professional consensus as to
what constitutes proper treatment.4 1 The process of developing
standards helps the medical profession reduce its risk of tort liabil-
ity in two significant ways. First, articulation and dissemination of
41. The wrongful birth and wrongful life suits pose interesting questions involv-
ing medical technology. The dramatically improved ability of physicians to
make diagnoses based upon such techniques as amniocentesis and ultra-
sound is at the root of such litigation and has spawned new specialties such
as genetic counseling. See Fraser, Introduction: The Development of Genetic
Counseling, in GENETIC COUNSELING: FACTS, VALUES AND Nomis (1979).
Many of the cases illustrate "zones of transition," with diagnostic error at the
root of the litigation. In Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), a child born with Tay-Sachs disease sued a physi-
cian and medical testing laboratories for negligently conducting certain ge-
netic tests on the parents. The court recognized a need to encourage "careful
genetic counseling and medical procedures" in light of the increase "of the
medical knowledge and skill needed to avoid genetic disaster." Having con-
sidered the principles applicable to the suit by the infant plaintiff against the
testing laboratory, the court concluded:
We have no difficulty in ascertaining and finding the existence of a
duty owed by medical laboratories engaged in genetic testing to par-
ents and their as yet unborn children to use ordinary care in admin-
istration of available tests for the purpose of providing information
concerning potential genetic defects in the unborn.
Id. at 822, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
The second case, Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981), in-
volved a suit brought by the parents of two children born with cystic fibrosis
against the pediatricians who treated the first child but who failed to diag-
nose her condition in time for parents to prevent, or to abort, the second preg-
nancy. Cystic fibrosis cannot be detected in a fetus through amniocentesis;
however, the simple, safe and highly reliable "sweat" test may be performed
on the child shortly after birth. A positive result indicates that the parents
are carriers of the disease and that future children may also be afflicted with
cystic fibrosis. Here, the treating physician never administered the sweat
test, despite the symptoms shown by the first child. By the time the parents
consulted a second specialist who performed the test and diagnosed the con-
dition of the first child, Mrs. Schroeder was eight months pregnant with a
second child.
Curlender and Schroeder illustrate a trend toward judicial allowance of
recovery for misdiagnosis of genetic defects. The increase in this type of liti-
gation reflects advances in the understanding of genetic defects and improve-
ments in diagnostic methods for predicting their occurrence. These cases
illustrate the connection between improved medical knowledge and diagnos-
tic procedures, and expanded tort liability. For a thorough discussion of the
problems, see Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 CoLum. L.
REv. 618 (1978); Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of
Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE I. 1488 (1978). For
an extended debate on the merits of wrongful life litigation, see Furrow, Im-
paired Children and Tort Remedies: The Emergence of a Consensus, 11 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 148 (1983); Furrow, Diminished Lives and Malpractice-




standards will educate those in a new specialty, so as to minimize
negligence through ignorance. Second, defendants can take ad-
vantage of the real areas of uncertainty by having experts testify
on their own behalf. Collection of data and pressure toward con-
sensus will be encouraged even by scattered litigation, for such
suits do not go unobserved; rather, they receive a great deal of ex-
posure through the medicolegal and medical presses. While the
threat of law suits raises the anxiety levels of professionals within
the practice of medicine, such anxiety can be productive if it forces
new specialty areas to develop standards.42
3. Standard-freezing
If any deviation from customary professional practice is held to
be negligentper se, then a standard-freezing effect exists, in which
an ossified customary practice can remain in effect long past its
prime. Exceptions such as the "best judgment" rule, the "respect-
able minority" rule, or "acceptable practice" would be narrowly
construed, if allowed to operate at all. Most courts, however, are
not inclined to follow such a rigid approach, since in most jurisdic-
tions some flexibility is built into the standard-setting process
through the establishment of doctrines protecting individual
judgment.
4. Standard-diffusing
The final approach-standard-diffusing-requires the court to
be liberal in its application of the exceptions to the customary
practice doctrine, as well as its application of evidentiary rules that
would allow medical treatises and journals supporting the defend-
ant's use of newer diagnostic or treatment approaches to come into
evidence. As our previous discussion suggests, a standard-dif-
fusing approach should be avoided, since one of the larger sources
of iatrogenesis and medical error is the rapid diffusion of question-
able techniques into use.
Of the four standards discussed, the standard-neutral approach
seems preferable to the other alternatives. However, judicial use
of a standard-forcing approach may be warranted in rare instances
where the professional practice is clearly inadequate or out-of-
date. The dissemination of complete and accurate information
gained through clinical research, and its proper use by practition-
42. For an interesting study on the effects of tort law on medical practice, see
Comment, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to De-
termine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L REV. 165 (1978) (concluding that




ers, is fundamentally a problem of medical education, for which
tort litigation is merely a stage on which to act out the drama of
harmful vogue therapies.
C. Medical Innovation and Evolving Standards of Care
The physician is the principal decisionmaker regarding the im-
plementation of most medical innovations, as he is the front-line
agent in diagnosing and treating patients. Therefore, in developing
a taxonomy of medical errors, it is necessary to develop some un-
derstanding of how medicine incorporates innovation, and how
tort law treats, or should treat, these "zones of transition."4 3 Diag-
nostic techniques provide an excellent example for testing how in-
novation should be treated, both in medicine and in law suits
involving medical technology.
Medicine increasingly relies upon new techniques and technol-
ogies of diagnosis, as doctors clamor for more data. Manufacturers
respond with an array of techniques and devices, and clinical re-
searchers suggest new approaches. Technologies such as ultra-
sound, automated clinical analyzers, and heart monitoring systems
are now commonly used, and further advances in diagnostic im-
agery can be expected in the next decade.44 This proliferation of
diagnostic tools and techniques is understandable, for diagnosis is
critical to the proper treatment of the patient and continues to be a
major source of physician error.45
The swift diffusion of new technological innovations into prac-
tice is fueled by many factors, including: medical ethics, the need
of a physician to do something in the face of patient needs, the
value society places on technology generally, the nature of medical
training, and reimbursement policies. 46 Research findings are of
great importance, since there is evidence that most physicians reg-
ularly read and take note of the new approaches to diagnosis or
43. Watson, supra note 3.
44. See 210 SCIENCE 227 (1980) (entire issue, no. 4467, devoted to new medical
technologies, providing an overview of recent developments in
instrumentation).
45. Data for the period between 1973 and 1980, collected by the St. Paul Fire &
Marine Casualty Ins. Co., the nation's largest medical malpractice insurer,
reveals that failure to diagnose was alleged in 25 percent of cases brought for
malpractice. 6 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABIIrY ADvIsoRY SERVICE 2 (1981).
Data from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, for suits be-
tween July and October of 1976, reveal that about 25 percent of all claims, and
about 50 percent of claims against internists and general practitioners, al-
leged diagnostic error, while inadequate testing claims were by far the most
numerous in non-surgical cases. Id.
46. Young, Communications Linking Clinical Research and Clinical Practice, Bi-
OMEDICAL INNOVATION 177 (1981).
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treatment that are published in medical periodicals. While skepti-
cism of these research findings is appropriate, one critic has ob-
served that such skepticism is not common.4 7 In spite of the lack
of evidence of efficacy, practitioners have fostered rapid adoption
of new technologies such as CT scanning and coronary after-sur-
gery and respirator therapy. In addition, the data and opinions
available to practitioners are often inadequate to allow them to
evaluate research findings, in that the studies themselves may
have significant defects; the studies may lack information as to
how to translate limited clinical research findings into practice; the
practitioner may not be aware of the unique nature of clinical tri-
als; or little guidance may be given to the practitioner for evaluat-
ing controversy over earlier studies.48
Despite the pitfalls of technological advances, a physician must
utilize new diagnostic technologies as part of his professional obli-
gation to his patients. He is "bound to keep abreast of the times." 49
However, the physician's relationship to a standard of practice is
considerably more complex than the general statements in the
caselaw suggest. Keeping "abreast of the times" is far too vague a
standard when the rate of medical change is accelerating well be-
yond a level known even twenty years ago. Individual physicians
respond to this accelerating technological change in varying ways.
A physician may fall within one of four technological-response
categories.
1. The Out-of-Touch Practitioner
The out-of-touch practitioner has failed, for a variety of reasons,
to adopt the mainstream standard of care of diagnostic testing. It
is an old and recurrent problem in the caselaw.50 An erroneous
diagnosis may be merely an error of judgment for which a physi-
cian is not liable; however, where an erroneous diagnosis results
from the physician's failure to administer standard tests, the phy-
sician may be deemed to have breached the standard of care and
found to be negligent. As one court said:
47. Id. at 182.
48. Id. at 190.
49. Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898).
50. InPeterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84 P.2d 999 (1938), the defendant physician
made a vaginal examination of the plaintiff and concluded that she was preg-
nant. However, it was later determined that she was not pregnant but had an
ovarian cyst. At trial, the plaintiff sought to admit into evidence testimony
showing that the rabbit test for pregnancy was 96 percent effective and was
well recognized in the local area; however, the evidence was excluded. On
appeal, the exclusion of the evidence was held to constitute prejudicial error
since it was material in deciding whether the defendant was negligent in fail-
ing to use the test earlier in the treatment.
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If a physician, as an aid to diagnosis, i.e., his judgment, does not avail him-
self of the scientific means and facilities open to him for the collection of
the best factual data upon which to arrive at his diagnosis, the result is not
an error of judgment but negligence in failing to secure an adequate fac-
tual basis upon which to support his diagnosis or judgment.5 1
Failure to recognize a new standard of medical practice repre-
sents the classic malpractice situation. Where the deviation from a
standard of care can be shown, recovery is likely if the proper
proof is presented. For example, since amniocentesis is now nor-
mally administered to pregnant women over the age of 35, a physi-
cian's failure to inform his patient of the availability of such a
procedure may lead to liability if a defective child is subsequently
born.5 2 Also, the failure of a practitioner to use computers to assist
in diagnosis may lead to liability. During the zone of transition be-
tween experimental uses of a new technology and its diffusion into
widespread use, a physician probably has little risk of liability.
However, once the diagnostic tool has come into widespread use
and is made affordable, the threat of liability is very real.S3
2. The Reluctant Practioner
Unlike the out-of-touch practitioner, a reluctant practitioner has
knowledge of the existence of medically accepted procedures or
techniques but may refuse to adopt them. Such would be the case
where a doctor refuses to use fetal monitors during labor, or to rec-
ommend their use to his patient, when such use has become stan-
dard practice. Under the traditional malpractice rule, this
deviation from the standard may be conclusive as to liability un-
less the physician is able to convince the jury that the general ac-
ceptance by his profession of such monitoring is not justified.5 4
The physician may attempt to discredit the standard by using sta-
tistics to show that the efficacy of the procedure is unproven in
light of its costs and in terms of increased Caesarean sections. He
may, thus, invoke the "best judgment" rule as a defense-a rule
that states that a physician should use his or her own best judg-
ment when the comnonplace medical practice is dangerous.5 5 In
51. Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1968) (quoting Smith v.
Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 105, 194 A.2d 167, 173 (1963)).
52. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
53. See Watson, supra note 3.
54. Capron, supra note 40, at 671.
55. See Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1968). "There is no policy reason why a physician, who knows or believes
there are unnecessary dangers in community practice, should not be re-
quired to take whatever precautionary measures he deems appropriate." Id.
at 263, 239 N.E.2d at 373, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 447. The institutional pressure, from
hospital administrators, to adopt new technologies may also stem from fears
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proffering this defense, the practitioner will face an uphill battle in
trying to justify his deviation from the generally accepted
standard.
3. The Faithful Follower
The third technological-response category of physicians is that
of the faithful follower. Such a physician is one who religiously
adopts the current mainstream practice and acts reasonably in his
belief that proper research has been done to justify a new proce-
dure. However, in three situations, the physician's blind adoption
of mainstream techniques may be inappropriate.
First, the current practice of physicians within the specialty
may lag behind improvements suggested by current research find-
ings. Practitioners may not hear about new research findings,
thereby failing to adopt valid, innovative technologies. For exam-
ple, psychotherapists who use Electro Convulsive Therapy (ECT)
persist in using bilateral electrode placement, despite evidence
that unilateral placement reduces adverse effects, particularly
those of memory cognitive malfunctions.56 An emerging consen-
sus by researchers may not be adopted by practitioners for rea-
sons related to the nature of their practice, or because they do not
keep up with the literature. In cases where the plaintiff can pres-
ent evidence as to the emerging consensus, courts have been will-
ing, on occasion, to treat compliance with a customary practice as
only partial, not conclusive, evidence of the standard of care.5 7
Second, the mainstream technology, particularly in the diag-
nostic area, may lead the physician to rely excessively on the tech-
nology for his data, causing him to relinquish other, more
traditional, clinical and diagnostic checks on error. Faulty lab re-
sults may go undetected,5 8 or more subtle problems may escape
of malpractice litigation and a perception that monitors provide a shield
against liability.
56. B. FuRRow, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 59 (1980).
57. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969). The Simon
court held that professionals may be liable for acts a jury considers detrimen-
tal to the public interest whether or not professional organization guidelines
have been adhered to. Compliance was considered persuasive, but not con-
clusive. The professionals in Simon were accountants who sought to use
their adherence to generally accepted accounting principles as a complete
defense. While it may be that courts will accord more deference to medical
professionals than to other professional groupings, cases like Helling suggest
that where the professional practice has pernicious effects, courts will over-
ride the practice. Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519, 519 P.2d 981, 983
(1974).
58. Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The rate of error in testing
laboratories has been described as "massive." See Culliton, Clinical Labs:
Bills Aimed at Correcting "Massive" Problems, 192 SCIENCE 531 (1976). See
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notice because traditional cross-checks have fallen into disuse.
The medical profession's current reliance on computerized axial
tomography (CAT) scanners in diagnosing certain brain lesions il-
lustrates this problem. 59 Since the use of CAT scanners became a
standard of practice within four years after its introduction, debate
has centered on its swift diffusion into mainstream use before its
efficacy and costs were properly evaluated. One report, looking be-
yond cost, noted that the scanner may even have a detrimental ef-
fect on therapy, since its accuracy in detecting brain lesions is high
(although not perfect), and so further steps are usually needed to
ensure that all lesions are detected. The use of the CAT scanner
tends to cut short the diagnostic workup and cause some treatable
lesions to be missed.60
Technologies of diagnosis, in particular, can develop a life of
their own. Excessive reliance on the computer, the X-ray machine,
the electrocardiograph, causes the treating physician to neglect his
own senses. The dependence on diagnostic information from com-
plex, automated devices may be counterbalanced by physician rec-
ognition that overreliance upon laboratory tests can lead to
liability, at least where cross-checks are available and are not
used.61
Finally, the mainstream practice may have diffused too quickly
into professional use. As in the case of gastric freezing of duodenal
ulcers,6 2 a technique's adverse effects should be sufficient to alert
the doctor to the hazards of following a particular customary prac-
also Levitt, Growth of Technology, and Corporate Profitmaking in Clinical
Laboratories, 8 J. HEALTH, PoLrrIcs, POLICY & LAw 732 (1984).
59. INsTrruTE OF MEDICINE, COMPUTED TOMOGRAPHIC SCANNING (1977). The con-
sensus on CT scanners is that they are now indispensable to radiologists.
See Kolata, Consensus on CT Scans, 214 SCIENCE 1327 (1981) (noting that CT
scans may be overused in a variety of situations).
60. Davis, Some Limitations of Computed Tomography in the Diagnosis ofNeuro-
logical Diseases, 127 Am. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 111, 121 (1976).
61. In Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1963), a mistake was made in the
diagnosis and management of a child born of parents with an Rh factor blood
incompatibility. Based upon incorrect laboratory tests, the physician mis-
diagnosed the jaundice that the infant showed, and he failed to give followup
tests. The court quoted, with approval, medical testimony that "where labo-
ratory tests are inconsistent with clinical findings, the laboratory tests should
re-run ... ." Id. at 677.
Excessive reliance on computer-assisted diagnosis, in lieu of other tradi-
tional crosschecks, may ultimately lead to liability if the program malfunc-
tions or is erroneously programmed for a certain disease or symptom. See
Hall, Psychiatrists' Computer Use Stirs Debate, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1983, at 31,
col. 2.
62. Fineberg, Gastric Freezing: A Study of the Diffusion of Equipment-Embodied




tice. Evidence of such adverse affects may be obtained through
the testimony of an expert or through periodicals and treatises.63
Where the medical literature discussing the adverse effects of a
particular procedure is clearly accessible, the imposition of tort lia-
bility might change the mainstream practice by highlighting the
technique that is ineffective or dangerous, and by bringing the new
results to the attention of other practitioners. Studies suggest that
if negative results from clinical tests become available after a med-
ical speciality has adopted a technique, practitioners will gradually
abandon the practice.6 4 The threat of litigation would encourage
the widespread abandonment of harmful practices, and under-
score the lack of efficacy or hazards inherent in particular diagnos-
tic and treatment techniques. 65
4. The Innovative Practitioner
Typically, the innovative physician wants to use a new proce-
dure or diagnostic device that has not yet been incorporated into
the professional standard. He may be liable if the procedure has
received little support in the medical literature, and if it does not
work properly. Even full disclosure of the experimental nature of
the procedure or device to his patients may not protect the physi-
cian from liability. Sound policy reasons dictate that full disclo-
sure should not be a defense to liability in this area. Use of a new
untested procedure or technique on a patient amounts to an ex-
perimentation. Such experimentation has been termed "nonvali-
dated practice," since the primary attribute of the novel practice is
"lack of suitable validating of [their] safety [and] efficacy." 66 The
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, discussing physician innova-
tion, wrote:
63. See FED. R. Evin. 803(18). The problem is that either the expert has to rely on
the periodical, or else the judge must take judicial notice under FED. R. EVID.
201; this requires a clearly reliable authority-a publication "recognized as a
standard authority by the medical profession." See Hemingway v. Ochsner
Clinic, 608 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1979) (text written by two nurses was not shown
to be reliable); Generella v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(statements from a respected medical publication, when independently used
as evidence of truth therein asserted, are inadmissible as violative of hearsay
rule).
64. Finkelstein, Schectman, Sondik & Gilbert, Clinical Trials and Established
Medical Practice: Two Examples, in BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 213 (1981).
65. Others have proposed national bodies to evaluate and regulate innovative
procedures. See, e.g., Necheles, Standards of Medical Procedure Become Ac-
cepted?, 10 L. MED. & HEALTH CAE 15 (1982). Unfortunately, no such na-
tional body presently exists.




Radically new procedures. . . should... be made the object of formal
research at an early stage in order to determine whether they are safe and
effective. Thus, it is the responsibility of medical practice committees, for
c:ample, to insist that a major innovation be incorporated into a formal
reseach project.6 7
The hospital may also face liability if unscreened experimental
procedures carried out by staff physicians result in injury.68
Innovation, in the context of the complexity of modern medical
practice, properly belongs in a controlled environment. Where suf-
ficient literature is available to suggest that controlled tests have
validated the procedure, a physician's risk of liability is dimin-
ished, and a "respectable minority" within the specialty area will
quickly emerge to use the procedure or device. Thus, physicians
are encouraged to become familiar with the merits of clinical test-
ing, the evaluation of results, and research protocols; those refus-
ing to do so assume the risk of liability in adopting a technique that
proves ineffective and dangerous.
D. Work Setting Errors
While solo practice has long been the ideal of medical practice,
the movement toward group practice has been inexorable. Group
physicians constituted 1.2 percent of the profession in 1940, 2.6 per-
cent in 1946, 5.2 percent in 1959, and 12.8 percent in 1969. By 1975,
over 18 percent of all active physicians practiced in groups of three
or more. By 1980, 88,000 physicians, or about 25 percent of the doc-
tors in private practice, worked in groups. 69 Other institutional
groups, in which physicians practice together, have also emerged.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) constitute the largest
of such groups; 70 emergency centers and surgical centers are two
67. NAT. COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT 3-4 (1978).
68. THE JOINT COMUSSION ON ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, STANDARD
IV (1982) (pertaining to the Medical Staff) provides:
The Medical Staff shall provide mechanisms for the regular review,
evaluation, and monitoring of medical staff practice and functions.
Such mechanisms shall be designed to maintain high professional
standards of care.
Id. at 106. Hospitals will need to develop policies to deal with potentially un-
validated diagnostic and treatment approaches. See Cowan, Hospital Re-
sponsibility for Innovative Therapy (unpublished paper on file with the
author).
69. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 425 (1982).
70. Id. at 415. See also Binford, Malpractice and the Prepaid Health Care Organi-
zation, 3 WHrrnER L. REV. 337 (1981); Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice




other emerging forms of institutional groups.7 '
The growth of the modern hospital as the locus of medical prac-
tice is another significant force transforming American medicine.72
Physicians have come to need hospital affiliation. By 1975, no phy-
sician would consider practicing without the resources that hospi-
tals offered, and 25 percent of the 330,000 active physicians
practiced fulltime in a hospital.73 So rapid is the movement of doc-
tors toward hospital affiliation that the hospital industry may end
up dominated by "huge health care conglomerates." 74 Almost 80
percent of the incidents that lead to malpractice claims occur in
hospitals, reflecting the primacy of the hospital as the locus of
most medical practice.75 The work setting of the hospital provides
a context in which "persistent and powerful demands cause the
individual to behave in a certain way regardless of his personal
qualities.176 These demands have resulted in peer pressure
against questioning a colleague's judgment or informing on his er-
rors. However, the incentive structure can be changed so as to fa-
cilitate the detection of errors.77
Large hospital practice has become the norm, as the larger hos-
pitals have become dominant through the federal health planning
process. 78 With hospitals growing more powerful, hospital admin-
istrators have also acquired greater power, developing "a natural
community of interest with staff physicians whose modes of prac-
tice utilize sophisticated technologies and justify further institu-
tional expansion." 7 9 One critic has contended that the
investments in such large facilities lead to "rigidifying of medical
practice around current patterns of treatment favored by the insti-
tution. The practice of medicine at the larger hospitals has set
community expectations and medical standards." 80 The "coming
71. See, e.g. Zaremski & Fohrman, The Emergicenter: Has Its Time Arrived?, 11 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 4 (1983).
72. See P. STARR, supra note 69, Ch. 5.
73. S. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 156 (1981).
74. See P. STARR supra note 69, at 428.
75. J. GUINTlER, THE MALPRAcTmoNERs 7 (1978) (citing results of a study con-
ducted by the Insurance Services Office).
76. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF AP-
PLIED KNOWLEDGE 94 (1970).
77. See Havighurst & Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance: A No-Fault Ap-
porach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 INS. W. 69 (1974)
(discussing an attempt to couple financial insurance incentives with risk dis-
closure). See generally INSTrruTE OF MEDICINE, BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COM-
PENSATION FOR MEDICAL INJURIES (1978).
78. Payton & Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospita Blue
Cross, and Certificate of Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 273 (1980).
79. Id. at 274.
80. Id. at 275.
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of the corporation"81 has, therefore, already had significant effects
on medical practice. The issue is whether tort rules should yield to
this transformation of practice, or seek to control or direct it.
Judicial expansion of malpractice liability, making physicians
accountable for a range of medical errors, has run counter to legis-
lative reforms in the malpractice area. Over the past decade, state
legislatures, responding to the so-called "malpractice crisis," have
abrogated or restricted the operation of legal doctrines from res
ipsa loquitur to informed consent.82 But the courts have recog-
nized the centrality of the hospital setting. Thus, hospitals have
been subjected to an expansion of the respondeat superior doc-
trine and are held to be responsible for the negligence of the physi-
cians practicing within them, even when the physicians are
operating as independent contractors. 83 An alternative theory of
"corporate negligence" has been premised on the hospital's duty to
exercise ordinary care in supervising its staff.84
A judicial movement toward strict liability for hospital services,
analogous to that which exists for some products, may also be de-
veloping. Some hospitals have been held liable for the harm
caused by medical instruments used in treating patients.85 Courts
have usually distinguished the rendition of professional services
from sale of goods.86 In recent cases, however, courts have begun
to examine the basis for strict liability in the medical context. In
Hoven v. Kelble,87 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, while re-
jecting strict liability for medical services, noted the similarity be-
tween a consumer's purchase of products and the patient's request
for medical treatment and care.
The typical purchaser of medical services cannot evaluate the quality of
care offered because medical services are complex and infrequently
bought. The medical care market gives the purchasers little assistance in
enabling the purchaser to evaluate what he or she is buying. It is gener-
ally the physician-not the patient-who determines the kind of services
to be rendered and how often .... The physician is in a better position
than the patient to determine and improve the quality of the services, and
the patient's reliance on the doctor's skill, care and reputation is perhaps
greater than the reliance of the consumer of goods. 88
In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Company,89 a federal district
81. See P. STARR, supra note 69, at 428.
82. See generally, S. LAw & S. PoLAq, supra note 25, at 97-119.
83. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
84. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
85. See Annot., 54 A.L.R. FED. 3D 258 (1971), for a list of cases.
86. See B. FuRRow, supra note 56, at 82.
87. 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
88. Id. at 468-69, 256 N.W.2d at 391 (footnote omitted).
89. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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court held strict liability to be a permissible theory of recovery for
defects in mechanical and administrative services in hospitals.
The court assumed, without deciding, that strict liability would
"not apply to professional medical services by doctors." 90 But it
reasoned that such an exemption should not apply to "those serv-
ices which hospitals perform for both doctors and patients," be-
cause of the "public interest" in having these services "performed
properly."9 '
These cases represent a judicial willingness to invoke tort lia-
bility where the harmful results of a treatment are forseeable and
avoidable. Courts are beginning to recognize that the hospital is in
the best position to monitor the iatrogenic effects which are tracea-
ble to the hospital's rendition of services, and that expanded liabil-
ity creates a substantial incentive to improve risk management
programs. Expanded liability may, therefore, foster a movement
by hospitals to keep better records, increase the frequency of con-
ferences on adverse outcomes, increase consultations, and estab-
lish evaluation of procedures which not only consider cost factors,
but also iatrogenic impact.
The tort law concept of foreseeability of harm provides the core
justification for a concept of medical culpability that would encom-
pass the three categories of medical errors discussed above. Fore-
seeability involves a prediction, at a time prior to the occurrence of
an injury, of the type of injury that might result from a treatment
error, its severity, and the probability that such an injury will oc-
cur.92 Where harm is likely to occur and the victim has neither
consented to nor can avoid the harm, "foreseeability of harm," as
the dominant test of a duty to prevent injury, requires the actor to
either take precautions or to face liability.
The focus of predictability of risk shifts the attention from the
individual within a professional group to the capabilities of the
group itself or, in the institutional setting, the hospital. Liability is
linked to predictability and to the ability of the profession to alter
90. Id. at 1066.
91. Id. at 1067.
92. See Judge Learned Hand's famous statement of the negligence calculus in
United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947):
[T] here can be no. . . general rule, when we consider the ground for
liability. [T] he... duty... to provide against resulting injuries is a
function of three variables: (1) The probability [of harm]; (2) the
gravity of the resulting injury... ; (3) the burden of adequate pre-
cautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it
in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, I, and
the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multi-




risks that it is able to predict.93
In each case, the test of foreseeability will depend on the in-
creased ability of modern medicine to predict, through its new
technologies and through the use of statistics, the risks involved in
certain practices. As institutions come to know more precisely the
extent of the risks associated with their activities, the ascription of
responsibility and culpability becomes possible and fair.94 Even if
a medical provider cannot predict the whole range of risks associ-
ated with his administration of service, he is in a better position
than the patient to detect and avoid as many of the risks as
possible.95
Placing the responsiblity for medical malpractice with the hos-
pitals would inevitably help to reduce the incidence of malpractice.
It has been observed that if a hospital faces liability directly or vi-
cariously for the negligence of its agents, it will tighten its control
over their practice of medicine. "Under corporate management,
there is also likely to be close scrutiny of mistakes, if only because
of corporate liability for malpractice." 96 Technology provides the
tools for monitoring a doctor's medical practice within the hospital,
allowing the determination of patterns of unusual patient loss or
excessive surgery rates, or other suspicious facts. As one hospital
administrator has noted: "The large conglomerate can purchase
and/or develop sophisticated quality-of-care control programs
managed by statisticians." 97 The work setting thus becomes more
93. See O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Propos-
als, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 790-94 (1973), for an analysis of the connection be-
tween culpability and predictability of risk.
94. Twiss, The Problem of Moral Responsibility in Medicine, 2 J. MED. & PHL. 330,
365 (1977). See Baram, Technology Assessment and Social Control, 180 Sci-
ENCE 465 (1973).
95. Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrance: An Economic View
of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978). See generally G.
CALABRESIS, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
96. See P. STAR supra note 69, at 447.
97. Id. Ironically, the computer may pose liability problems for the hospital at
the same time that its capabilities provide better quality control. The issue is
the legal standard by which to measure computer related errors: Are com-
puter program services subject to a negligence standard, or are they products
subject to strict liability?-The issue has not been resolved by the courts, but
one recent commentary concludes:
[W]hen hospitals, physicians, or programmers have considered the
question of liability, they have tended to think in terms of negligence
and malpractice. By creating, distributing, or even merely using
computer programs, however, they may have moved toward the area
of strict liability, formerly the domain of drug manufacturers, auto-
mobile manufacturers and other traditional industrial producers.
Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective
Computer Programs, 7 Am. J.L. & MED. 123, 144 (1981).
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important in reducing medical error; malpractice can become the
spur, provided that expanding theories of liability cause the atten-
tion to be focused on the hospital and away from the individual
practitioners.
M. CONCLUSION
The physician has, until now, been the principal decisionmaker
regarding the implementation of most medical innovations. Regu-
latory policies to control the introduction of new technologies are
often "all or nothing" propositions; they either prohibit the tech-
nology until a high standard of safety is met, as with the Medical
Device Amendments of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, or leave
control to the informal pressures of the marketplace. Thorough
premarket testing cannot always detect adverse reactions that are
eventually exposed with the passage of time; malpractice suits
thus become an important form of postmarket monitoring of the
technology. Such suits, focusing on the practitioner's application
of technology in the particular case, can subject the professional
standard to the spotlight of review pertaining to its efficacy, poten-
tially adverse effects, and its rate of diffusion into mainstream use.
As one commentator has written:
Physicians will inevitably make mistakes, but they should not err for the
wrong reasons, such as misplaced reliance on fragmentary information,
succumbing to the force of authority rather than depending on the
strength of evidence, suspicion of population based studies, ignorance of
the pitfalls and requirements for statistically and scientifically valid
clinical research, a need to have the latest gadget, a desire to achieve pres-
tige, defend a reputation, or gain financially.9 8
Other malpractice developments may also result in alteration of
professional attitudes and practices. The doctrine of informed con-
sent, while still bitterly resisted by some members of the medical
profession,99 has had an impact on medical disclosure practices,
resulting in more clearly articulated disclosures by physicians of
hazards and alternatives.100 Legal rules, if they are seen as techni-
cal and are mechanically applied, are of little use; but when the
values inherent in such doctrines as informed consent become in-
ternalized, there will be more changes and further reforms.
Tort law has a role to play in regulating medical errors. The
malpractice suit can signal the need for change in the habits of the
individual practitioner or in the institutional practices of the hospi-
98. Fineberg, supra note 62, at 191.
99. See, e.g., Grudner, On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 900 (1980).
100. Doctrinal changes in tort law have altered the physician-patient relationship
in the direction of fuller disclosure. See Novak, supra note 4, at 898.
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tal. It may help to expose the ethical renegades. It may provide
direct deterrent effects through dollar judgments and the nontan-
gible costs of litigation. Litigation may articulate new duties, vali-
dating existing norms or promoting the centrality of new ones. It
may announce new concepts of responsibility, requiring medical
specialities to reexamine their diagnostic procedures and treat-
ment modalities. It may alter the work setting, spurring improved
quality control by expanding the liability of institutions which in-
creasingly dominate health care delivery. Litigation has the ad-
vantage of not requiring legislation to put its reforms into
operation. It can be triggered by a single plaintiff. Once the court's
intervention is sought, it must act on the case before it.
The recent studies of iatrogenesis suggest that medical errors
are a real and substantial problem but that the medical profession
still seeks to avoid linking culpability with medical error. It is not
uncommon to find the legal system blamed for medicine's own tar-
diness in implementing effective monitoring of iatrogenic harms.
Malpractice suits may be the best source of regulation currently
available for iatrogenic outcomes in the health care system. Pro-
posals to reform the medical malpractice system will be inade-
quate if they ignore this primary need to deter bad medical
practices.
The medical establishment needs to be made more aware of the
risks it creates. Accordingly, future reforms must note the real
problems of medical error and the incentives for correction pro-
vided by malpractice litigation. Any "no fault" system, national
health insurance plan, or other legislative reform, must provide an
alternative means of deterring iatrogenic outcomes.
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